The fight in Afghanistan is now the longest-running war in U.S. history. But this conflict doesn’t seem to have an impact on Americans’ day-to-day lives. We asked an international expert to share his insights about why this war hasn’t resonated with the American public like past conflicts and to answer why we should care.
by Bruce Cauthen ’84
As the war in Afghanistan lumbered into its ninth year, thereby acquiring the unenviable distinction of becoming America’s longest war, it was perhaps inevitable that the already exhaustive inventory of essays, op-eds and blog posts exploring the parallels between U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Vietnam would be augmented by even more explicit warnings about repeating the same mistakes of the past. Although I’m inclined to agree that there are some worrisome similarities, it seems to me that the two conflicts are incongruous in one significant aspect: how they’ve resonated in the American consciousness.
While the reality of the Vietnam War supplied an inescapable backdrop to American life during the late 1960s and early ’70s, the ostensible effect of Afghanistan has been far less palpable. Indeed, for the better part of the last decade, it seems that the conflict in Afghanistan has occupied a rather fleeting, episodic and incidental place in the American imagination.
At the outset of the air strikes on Kabul in October 2001, there was nearly universal popular agreement that the United States had no choice but to dislodge the Taliban regime; yet, very soon thereafter, America’s focus was diverted to another antagonist in the Bush Administration’s rapidly expanding War on Terror: Saddam Hussein. The fact – or so we were told – that the Iraqi dictator had not only cavorted with bin Laden, but also wielded a formidable arsenal of weapons of mass destruction somehow seemed to marginalize the mission in Afghanistan. Policy debate and mainstream media alike were dominated by Iraq, and it appeared that Afghanistan had been almost completely superseded – so much so that journalists and pundits began to refer to Afghanistan as “the other war” and even “the forgotten war.”
During the presidential campaign of 2008, candidate Barack Obama suggested that Afghanistan had been imprudently neglected and that, if elected, he would refocus American wherewithal on this strategic theater. By the time President Obama authorized the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops for Afghanistan in December 2009, however, the war there had yet again been eclipsed by a new, more immediate crisis: the financial meltdown and an attendant recessive economy.
The attention of the American people was now understandably concentrated much closer to home and more urgently on their lost jobs, declining portfolios and plummeting property values. As the American dream became a nightmare, one could surely understand the multiplying degrees of psychological separation from a war in a remote and inscrutable land. And so, Afghanistan had again receded into near oblivion.
The U.S. campaign in Afghanistan was catapulted back into the headlines when, in May, the death toll of American forces climbed beyond the 1,000 mark. Then, in June, Rolling Stone magazine released a sensationalistic exposé in which General Stanley McChrystal and his aides castigated the commander in chief – and numerous others in the Obama White House – for what the warriors regarded as inadequate support for the current policy of counterinsurgency. Their remonstrance seemed little more than a cynical and callous amalgam of ad hominem insults, but the magazine had hardly hit the newsstands when Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele ignited another spectacular firestorm, denouncing the war as one of “Obama’s choosing” and declaring that victory was impossible as no combatant had ever prevailed in a land war in Afghanistan.
The statistics hardly warranted optimism, either, as June had emerged as the most lethal month of the war with a total of 60 American fatalities – only to be surpassed by July’s record of 63.
Yet, if the nation was becoming accustomed to shocking revelations about Afghanistan, it was to experience its most monumental manifestation when Wikileaks posted a voluminous dossier of secret government files reinforcing the general perception of a military campaign that had encountered repeated setbacks. Wikileaks rather tantalizingly taunted that even more explosive material was in hand and likely to be subsequently released, and public attention remained somewhat transfixed on this particular issue.
But, then, all of this too began to fade from current contemplation. The media was soon absorbed by the withdrawal of the combat battalions from Baghdad – with NBC even providing live coverage as the troops rolled back toward the Kuwaiti border – and Afghanistan had again been eclipsed by Iraq.
It is disillusioning that it has taken the increasingly heavy loss of American soldiers, the bombastic and counterproductive rhetoric from prominent officials who should have known better and the outrageous theft and reckless publication of classified documents to return Afghanistan to the front page – even if temporarily. Yet, perhaps if the American public had been more actively engaged with the issue, we would not now be ensnared in an exorbitantly taxing war in which we do not appear to be prevailing.
I had hoped that the transition from McChrystal to David Petraeus would provide an opportunity for a vigorous policy debate in the U.S. Senate, in the salon and in the street; however – with the war in Afghanistan being the nonissue which it has increasingly become – such was not the case. In fact, when Petraeus cited school enrollment and immunizations as benchmarks of progress during his confirmation hearing, I knew we’d be stuck with this deeply defective policy for the intermediate term. It would seem that the rationale behind what some are now calling “Obama’s escalation” had become muddled, and the strategy it underpins increasingly ineffective. If the military objective is now to facilitate the emergence of a unified, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, I fear our soldiers will remain there for many decades to come and will continue to suffer unconscionable losses.
And, this is exactly why the war in Afghanistan must resonate more powerfully in the public consciousness. The people must influence official policy and ensure that American forces are not expended in the pursuit of impractical objectives that do little to promote our national security interests. The war has gone from bad to worse, and the time for a comprehensive reassessment of our involvement there is long past due. Moreover – with the relentless recession, TARP, the stimulus, a declining dollar, “Cash for Clunkers,” the gargantuan debt owed to China, “Obamacare,” and the $1 trillion deficit – how can we continue to afford the purported expenditure of $8 billion per month to fund a military campaign which has obviously gone awry?
But then again, how can we foresee the hardships we face in the future if we can’t even learn from the mistakes of our past?
– Bruce Cauthen ’84 is a public speaker, scholar and business consultant in the field of international affairs. To learn more about Cauthen’s work and research, check out www.brucecauthen.com.
AP Photo / Pier Paolo Cito
